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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The question has never arisen in Indiana but the courts would probably
follow the rule of Bermard v. Black, supra, in requiring actual notice, altho states having a criminal statute similar to Indiana's have held constructive notice sufficient. Hughes v. Mortin, (Okla.) 196 Pac. 951; State
v. Perry, 194 La. 1065, 90 So. 406.
J. S. G.
CONDEMNATION-PROPERTY

RIGHTS

IN

SPACE

UNDER

SIDEWALI-Ap-

pellant had built a ten story building on a corner, and with permission of
the city, by furnishing the proper support, built a vault under the sidewalk which was 181/ feet wide, extending the entire length of the building.
Wells were drilled in this basement, furnishing the buildings water supply,
the heating and lighting systems were installed therein and there were
several very valuable rooms for rental purposes. The city notified appellant that ten feet of the sidewalk was to be taken for street purposes, and
that appellant must either fill in part of his basement, or furnish adequate
steel support. The loss of this space would greatly inconvenience appellant
as well as put him to considerable expense, and the alternative of furnishing support would cost $12,500. Appellant claims property should be condemned by the city, and compensation given. Held, city may require evacuation without compensation because the easement of the public is paramount to any private use of abutting owners, where fee is in the abutting
owner, and where the fee is in the municipality, the abutting owner could
have no more than a mere license, and revocable at will without compensation. Swain v. City of Indianapolis, Supreme Court of Indiana, 171 N. E.
871.
There are several questions which help in deterjmining this problemwhether or not there is a difference between the use of servitude as a sidewalk and as a street, and whether the change from the use as a sidewalk
to that of a street for vehicular traffic is such an added burden as entitled
the owner of the fee to compensation. Also, there is the question as to
whether or not the easement extends below the surface of the street, and
last what are the peculiar rights of the public in an easement.
There is an abundance of authority to the effect that the street includes
all the easement from property line to property line, with no distinction
between that part used for pedestrian traffic and that used for vehicular
traffic, as it effects the burden on the servient estate. City of Kokomo v.
Mahan, 100 Ind. 242; Coburn v. New Telephone Co., 156 Ind. 90; Elliott
on "Roads and Streets," Vol. I, sec. 23. The courts go far in allowing added
uses of streets without considering it an additional servitude. In Magee
v. Overshiner, 150 Ind. 127 the court held that placing of telephone poles
in curb constituted no additional servitude for which the owner of the fee
might be entitled to compensation. Still more liberal was the Massachusetts court in Sears v. Crocker, 184 Mass. 586, 69 N. E. 27, in holding that
where the city built a tunnel under the street to accommodate additional
traffic, necessitating the abandonment of many vaults and valuable usages
of abutting owners, there was no additional servitude and no taking without
due process of law. Cooly on Constitutional Limitations, pp. 556, says,
"When land is taken or deducted for a street it is unquestionably appropriated for all the ordinary purposes of a town street-not merely the

RECENT CASE NOTES
purposes to which such street was formerly applied, but those demanded
by new improvements and new wants." In Elliott on Roads and Streets,
4th Ed. Vol. 1 Sec. 20 it is said "The right of the public is by no means
confined to the surface of the way, and this all who set apart land for a
street are conclusively presumed to know. 'Street' means more than surface, it means the whole surface and so much of the depth as is and can
be used, not unfairly, for the ordinary purposes of a street." Again, the
principle is expounded, as follows: "The lot owners rights are subject to
the paramount right of the public, and the rights of the public are not
limited to a mere right of way, but extended ... to all beneficial, legitimate
street uses, as the public good or convenience may from time to time require. The use of the streets . might be seriously affected by the recognition of a right of an abutting owner to make at pleasure openings in, or
even under the street or sidewalk, except subject to unreasonable regulations." Dillon-Mlunicipal Corporations (14th Ed.) p. 699.
The abutting owner cannot complain for consequential damage done by
change of grade or other improvements, if there is no negligence or lack of
skill or added burden. Morris v. City of Indianapolis, 177 Ind. 369; Snyder
v. Town of Rockport, 6 Ind. 236; Macy v. City of Indianapolis.
Hence it appears that the abutting owner cannot complain for consequential damage done by improving the street unless there is an additional
servitude, negligence or lack of skill, and that the change is of a sidewalk
or part thereof to use as part of the street for vehicular traffic is not an
added burden or servitude for which there must be compensation-also that
the use and control of the easement is not limited merely to the surface but
extends as far below and above as is necessary to the use of the city for
street purposes.
The case of Coburn v. New Telephone Co., 156 Ind. 90, though not cited
by the court in the opinion in the case under discussion, is almost directly
in point, except that there the abutter had not completed the vault under
the sidewalk, but the additional use imposed was even more questionable
than here, being the laying of a telephone cable five feet under the sidewalk,
encased in a concrete vault; of course done with permisson of the city.
The court held there was no additional servitude, nor taking of property
without compensation and claimed recovery.
So the principal case is supported in its legal principals by almost
universal authority as well as direct Indiana precedent.
E. M.
COURTS--APPELLATE JURISDICTION

OF CIRCUIT CouRTs OF APPEALs-

FINAL DECREE OR JUDGAENT-Plaintiff below brought an action in a District Court of the United States which he designated as a bill in equity
for recovery for breach of contract. The lower court found that the alleged contract between the plaintiff and defendant was a good and valid
one, that the defendant had breached the provisions thereof, and that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover. It was then decreed that the defendant
render a full, true, and accurate account of all due to the plaintiff under
said contract, and pay the same to plaintiff with interest. The case was
referred to a master in chancery to ascertain and report to the court the
amount due to the plaintiff in accordance with the above decree, the plaintiff to have judgment for such amount as the master's report would show

